I am a professor in Economics at Queen Mary University of London and research associate at the University of Adelaide. My main research interests are in economic theory, with a particular emphasis on mechanism and information design. I am also a keen runner and enjoy food, wines and beers. Last updated: May 2019.
Some recent publications: "Revealed Preferences Tests Under Risk And Uncertainty," (with Matt Polisson and John Quah), June 2019, conditionally accepted American Economic Review. "Information Design in Multi-stage Games," (with Miltos Makris), February 2019, working paper. "Bilateral Trading in Networks,'' (with D. Condorelli and A. Galeotti), 2017, Review of Economic Studies, 84, pp. 82-105. "Repeated Nash Implementation,'' (with C. Mezzetti), 2017, Theoretical Economics, 12, pp.249-285.. "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments,'' (with T. Tomala), 2015, Journal of Economic Theory,159, pp. 401-442. "Mechanism Design with Ambiguous Communication Devices," (with Subir Bose), 2014, Econometrica, 82, pp 1853-1872.
Four axioms for a good collaboration: The four axioms for a good collaboration of Hardy and Littelwood. (From "Littlewood's miscellany," edited by Bollobas.) Axiom 1: When one author writes to a co-author, it is completely indifferent whether he is right or wrong. Axiom 2: When one author receives a letter (e-mail, nowadays) from a co-author, he is under no obligation whatsoever to read it, let alone to answer it. Axiom 3: It is preferable that each author works on different parts (aspects) of the research project. Axiom 4: It does not matter who contributes what.