I am a professor in Economics at Queen Mary University of London, CEPR fellow and research associate at the University of Adelaide.
My main research interests are in economic theory, with a particular emphasis on mechanism and information design, and revealed preferences.
I am a member of the sub-panel 16 for Economics and Econometrics at the REF2021. It is an interesting experience, but time-consuming.
I am also a keen runner and enjoy food, wines and other spirits.
Last updated: November 2021.
Some recent publications:
"Information Design in Multi-stage Games," (with Miltos Makris), 2021
"Robust communication on Networks,'' (with Marie Laclau and Xavier Venel), 2021.
"Cross-verificiation and Persuasive Cheap Talk," (with Alp Atakan and Mehmet Emekci), 2021.
"Contracting over Persistent Information,'' (with Zhao Wei, Claudio Mezzetti and Tristan Tomala), 2021.
"Dynamic Choices and Common Learning," (with Rahul Deb), 2021.
"Revealed Preferences Tests Under Risk And Uncertainty," (with Matt Polisson and John Quah), 2020, American Economic Review, 110, pp. 1782-1820.
"Bilateral Trading in Networks,'' (with D. Condorelli and A. Galeotti), 2017, Review of Economic Studies, 84, pp. 82-105.
"Repeated Nash Implementation,'' (with C. Mezzetti), 2017, Theoretical Economics, 12, pp.249-285..
"Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments,'' (with T. Tomala), 2015, Journal of Economic Theory,159, pp. 401-442.
"Mechanism Design with Ambiguous Communication Devices," (with Subir Bose), 2014, Econometrica, 82, pp 1853-1872.
Four axioms for a good collaboration:
The four axioms for a good collaboration of Hardy and Littelwood. (From "Littlewood's miscellany," edited by Bollobas.)
Axiom 1: When one author writes to a co-author, it is completely indifferent whether he is right or wrong.
Axiom 2: When one author receives a letter (e-mail, nowadays) from a co-author, he is under no obligation whatsoever to read it, let alone to answer it.
Axiom 3: It is preferable that each author works on different parts (aspects) of the research project.
Axiom 4: It does not matter who contributes what.
My main research interests are in economic theory, with a particular emphasis on mechanism and information design, and revealed preferences.
I am a member of the sub-panel 16 for Economics and Econometrics at the REF2021. It is an interesting experience, but time-consuming.
I am also a keen runner and enjoy food, wines and other spirits.
Last updated: November 2021.
Some recent publications:
"Information Design in Multi-stage Games," (with Miltos Makris), 2021
"Robust communication on Networks,'' (with Marie Laclau and Xavier Venel), 2021.
"Cross-verificiation and Persuasive Cheap Talk," (with Alp Atakan and Mehmet Emekci), 2021.
"Contracting over Persistent Information,'' (with Zhao Wei, Claudio Mezzetti and Tristan Tomala), 2021.
"Dynamic Choices and Common Learning," (with Rahul Deb), 2021.
"Revealed Preferences Tests Under Risk And Uncertainty," (with Matt Polisson and John Quah), 2020, American Economic Review, 110, pp. 1782-1820.
"Bilateral Trading in Networks,'' (with D. Condorelli and A. Galeotti), 2017, Review of Economic Studies, 84, pp. 82-105.
"Repeated Nash Implementation,'' (with C. Mezzetti), 2017, Theoretical Economics, 12, pp.249-285..
"Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments,'' (with T. Tomala), 2015, Journal of Economic Theory,159, pp. 401-442.
"Mechanism Design with Ambiguous Communication Devices," (with Subir Bose), 2014, Econometrica, 82, pp 1853-1872.
Four axioms for a good collaboration:
The four axioms for a good collaboration of Hardy and Littelwood. (From "Littlewood's miscellany," edited by Bollobas.)
Axiom 1: When one author writes to a co-author, it is completely indifferent whether he is right or wrong.
Axiom 2: When one author receives a letter (e-mail, nowadays) from a co-author, he is under no obligation whatsoever to read it, let alone to answer it.
Axiom 3: It is preferable that each author works on different parts (aspects) of the research project.
Axiom 4: It does not matter who contributes what.
