I am a professor in Economics at Queen Mary University of London, CEPR fellow and Associate Editor at Games and Economic Behavior.
My main research interests are in economic theory, with a particular emphasis on mechanism and information design, and revealed preferences.
I was a member of the sub-panel 16 for Economics and Econometrics at the REF2021. It was an interesting experience, albeit time-consuming (with obvious consequences on my research time).
I am also a keen runner and enjoy food, wines and other spirits.
Last updated: September 2023.
Some recent publications:
"Contracting over Persistent Information,'' (with Zhao Wei, Claudio Mezzetti and Tristan Tomala), Theoretical Economics, forthcoming, 2023.
"Information Design in Multi-stage Games," (with Miltos Makris), 2023, Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.
"Which Wage Distributions are Consistent with Statistical Discrimination?" (with Rahul Deb), 2023.
"Robust Communication on Networks,'' (with Marie Laclau and Xavier Venel), 2022.
"Cross-verificiation and Persuasive Cheap Talk," (with Alp Atakan and Mehmet Emekci), 2022.
"Dynamic Choices and Common Learning," (with Rahul Deb), 2021.
"Revealed Preferences Tests Under Risk And Uncertainty," (with Matt Polisson and John Quah), 2020, American Economic Review, 110, pp. 1782-1820.
Four axioms for a good collaboration:
The four axioms for a good collaboration of Hardy and Littelwood. (From "Littlewood's miscellany," edited by Bollobas.)
Axiom 1: When one author writes to a co-author, it is completely indifferent whether he is right or wrong.
Axiom 2: When one author receives a letter (e-mail, nowadays) from a co-author, he is under no obligation whatsoever to read it, let alone to answer it.
Axiom 3: It is preferable that each author works on different parts (aspects) of the research project.
Axiom 4: It does not matter who contributes what.
My main research interests are in economic theory, with a particular emphasis on mechanism and information design, and revealed preferences.
I was a member of the sub-panel 16 for Economics and Econometrics at the REF2021. It was an interesting experience, albeit time-consuming (with obvious consequences on my research time).
I am also a keen runner and enjoy food, wines and other spirits.
Last updated: September 2023.
Some recent publications:
"Contracting over Persistent Information,'' (with Zhao Wei, Claudio Mezzetti and Tristan Tomala), Theoretical Economics, forthcoming, 2023.
"Information Design in Multi-stage Games," (with Miltos Makris), 2023, Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.
"Which Wage Distributions are Consistent with Statistical Discrimination?" (with Rahul Deb), 2023.
"Robust Communication on Networks,'' (with Marie Laclau and Xavier Venel), 2022.
"Cross-verificiation and Persuasive Cheap Talk," (with Alp Atakan and Mehmet Emekci), 2022.
"Dynamic Choices and Common Learning," (with Rahul Deb), 2021.
"Revealed Preferences Tests Under Risk And Uncertainty," (with Matt Polisson and John Quah), 2020, American Economic Review, 110, pp. 1782-1820.
Four axioms for a good collaboration:
The four axioms for a good collaboration of Hardy and Littelwood. (From "Littlewood's miscellany," edited by Bollobas.)
Axiom 1: When one author writes to a co-author, it is completely indifferent whether he is right or wrong.
Axiom 2: When one author receives a letter (e-mail, nowadays) from a co-author, he is under no obligation whatsoever to read it, let alone to answer it.
Axiom 3: It is preferable that each author works on different parts (aspects) of the research project.
Axiom 4: It does not matter who contributes what.
